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Abstract
The typical narrative regarding the evolution of world trade prior to World War II
refers to a secular rise that started around 1870 and a subsequent collapse that began in
1914. This narrative, though, is based on measures of trade openness that do not fully take
into account purchasing power di¤erences across countries, as in the literature non-PPP-
adjusted trade data are typically denominated by PPP-adjusted GDP data. The present
paper seeks to resolve this inconsistency by constructing new trade share estimates for 51
countries spanning the period from 1870 to 1949 by combining historical import and export
data with non-PPP-adjusted GDP values that we estimate via the "short-cut" method. Our
estimates indicate a much more pronounced rise and fall of world trade over this period with
trade shares being on average 32% higher than previously documented and the worlds level
of openness to trade in 1913 being comparable to that in 1974. In addition, performing
a similar correction for purchasing power di¤erences in the context of standard gravity
regressions for the 1870-1939 period we nd that the existing literature has overestimated
the importance of income movements during this period relative to tari¤s changes and the
evolution of the gold standard.
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1 Introduction
We live in a globalized world. Yet, to what extent is the recent globalization movement that the
world has witnessed since the 1950s a singular experience? A precise answer to such a question
requires a careful quantication of how open the world economy was prior to World War II. The
present paper is the rst to attempt to consistently measure trade openness for a large number
of countries during the period from 1870 to 1949. Based on that, we then seek to reassess the
determinants of international economic integration, as it evolved over this period.
Our choice to focus on the eight decades prior to 1950 is neither accidental nor without
precedent. In the recent years a growing number of international economists and economic
historians has turned to the study of this period that comprises the years of World War I and
II, the turbulent interwar era as well as the pre-war Belle Époche.1 Particularly this last period
-often referred to as the rst globalization era- has attracted a lot of attention, as it very much
resembles todays world in terms of international trade as well as capital ows.2
However, as with the study of any historical period, existing work that has attempted to
assess and analyze the degree of openness of di¤erent economies and the world as a whole during
the pre-World-War-II period has been constrained by the incompleteness of the available data.
As a consequence, when measuring trade shares researchers were typically forced to combine
nominal, namely non-PPP-adjusted, export and import data with real, namely PPP-adjusted,
GDP values such as those of Maddison (2001).3 ;4 Trade shares calculated in this fashion, though,
are subject to systematic biases given the well-known fact that relative price di¤erences across
countries vary systematically with the level of economic development.5
To avoid such biases in the present paper we construct trade shares for the largest-possible
set of countries spanning the period from 1870 to 1949 based on non-PPP-adjusted GDP values.
These values are estimated via the "short-cut" method, a method which enables the prediction
of nominal from real income values and vice versa, as we explain in Section 2. Following this
method, which was widely used at the time when internationally comparable national account
data were more scarce, we can obtain estimates for non-PPP-adjusted GDP for the period of
interest for 68 countries based on the PPP-adjusted GDP gures of Maddison (2001). Given the
available export and import data, this allows for the consistent measurement of trade shares for
51 countries.
To assess the quality of our estimated nominal income and implied trade share data, we
1See for example the work of ORourke and Williamson (1999), Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003),
Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2010), Schularick and Solomou (2011) and the references therein.
2See for example the comparisons made by Krugman (1995) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
3Following the language of the international comparison literature, we will often use the term "real" to refer
to PPP-adjusted measures and the term "nominal" to non-PPP-adjusted ones.
4Examples of cases were nominal trade data were combined with real income data can be found in Estevade-
ordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003), Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) and Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2011).
5Kravis (1984) and the extensive literature on international comparisons have made this point forcefully.
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compare them with the corresponding ones that we were able to obtain from existing historical
sources for a small set of 16 countries for the years prior to 1949. For those limited cases, as we
document in Sections 2 and 3, we nd our estimated values to be remarkably close to the actual
ones. Moreover, we also compare our non-PPP-adjusted GDP and trade share estimates with
those obtained in the case where no correction for purchasing power di¤erences is made. This
latter comparison reveals that, as one would expect, not correcting for such di¤erences leads to
a substantial underestimation of trade shares for most countries.6
Having established the quality of our estimated trade shares, in Section 3, we then turn to
discuss what they imply for the evolution of world trade prior to World War II. In this context we
rst document how overall both the expansion of international trade over the 1870-1913 period
as well as its collapse between 1919 and 1939 was much more pronounced than what the existing
literature has suggested. Specically we nd that trade shares during the period 1870-1949 were
on average 32% higher than what previous research had established, implying that the extent
of international trade during the height of the rst globalization era was comparable to that
observed during the mid 1970s. In addition, tracking the behavior of our trade share estimates
across di¤erent regions of the globe, we observe di¤erent regional patterns with the Western
European economies driving the pre-World-War-I trade expansion and these economies together
with those of Latin America accounting for most of the subsequent retreat.
Extending our analysis beyond the discussion of global and regional trade patterns that
prevailed prior to World War II, in Section 4 we also pursue a gravity approach to shed more
light on the determinants of international trade ows going back to 1870. In this respect we
follow closely the work of Eichengreen and Irwin (1995), Irwin and Terviö (2002), Estevadeordal,
Frantz, and Taylor (2003), Lopez-Cordova andMeissner (2003), Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2010)
and others who have employed gravity models to analyze historical bilateral trade ows. Yet,
in contrast to most existing contributions, we estimate our gravity specication combining non-
PPP-adjusted bilateral trade data with our estimated non-PPP-adjusted income data instead of
PPP-adjusted ones.
Focusing on the role of income growth, tari¤s and the gold standard in inuencing trade ows
between countries, we consider their predictive power in the context of the gravity model and
the relative importance of each in explaining the evolution of bilateral trade ows over time. In
this context we show how the common approach of employing PPP-adjusted GDP data instead
of non-PPP-adjusted ones leads to a systematic overestimation of the e¤ect of income growth
and an underestimation of that of tari¤s and the gold standard. Yet, as we demonstrate in a
counterfactual analysis based on our gravity estimation results, pair-specic income movements
still explain most of the observed growth in bilateral trade during the rst globalization era.
6This is due to imports and exports being divided with PPP-adjusted income values that are higher than their
corresponding non-PPP-adjusted counterparts.
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Contrary, though, during the interwar period the collapse of bilateral trade ows was primarily
the result of the global trend towards trade disintegration.
2 Estimating Nominal GDP
2.1 The "Short-Cut" Method
A correct calculation of historical trade shares based on nominal trade data requires a corre-
sponding set of nominal, namely non-PPP-adjusted, GDP values. Such information, though, is
currently only scarcely available. To avoid this data limitation problem, we employ the "short-
cut" method in order to estimate nominal GDP in current prices for the largest possible set of
countries and time-periods based on the available information on real, namely PPP-adjusted,
GDP. This method has a long tradition in the literature on international comparison going back
to the work of David (1972) and Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978) and was recently revived
by Prados de la Escosura (2000).7 Its rationale is to exploit the existence of a fundamental
structural relationship between nominal and real GDP in per capita terms, which is stable across
countries and time.
The posited relationship arises from the basic fact that the ratio of nominal to real GDP per
capita in a given country at any point in time - when each is expressed relative to a base country-
reects the countrys general price level vis-à-vis that of the base country. This in turn depends
on the relative price levels of the countrys traded and non traded goods. The former tends to
approach unity with international competition, while the latter depends on the countrys relative
income level, as the Balassa-Samuelson theorem predicts.8 As a result, the overall price level of
a country - and so its ratio of nominal to real per capita GDP - should vary with the countrys
level of development and degree of openness. This implies the existence of a direct relationship
between relative nominal and real GDP per capita.
Denoting with yPPPi the level of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of a country i relative to
the base country -which for the context of our analysis we take to be the United States- and
ynon PPPi the corresponding level of non-PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, the "short-cut" method
posits that,
ynon PPPi = f(y
PPP
i ; P Ii); (1)
with PIi being a measure of country is degree of price isolation from the rest of the world.9
7Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978), for example, employed this method to predict PPP-adjusted GDP per
capita for more than a 100 countries using information from a sample of 16 countries.
8See Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
9We should note here that the basic relationship (1) underlying the "short-cut" method can also be considered
with yPPPi being the dependent variable as in Prados de la Escosura (2000). Yet, as Kravis, Heston, and Summers
(1978) emphasize it is more appropriate -in terms of causality- to treat, as we do, ynon PPPi as the dependent
variable.
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Assuming this relationship to be approximately log-linear we can rewrite expression (1) as:
ln ynon PPPi = + 1 ln y
PPP
i + 2(ln y
PPP
i )
2 + 3 lnPopi + 4 lnAreai + 5 lnOP
FR
i + "i: (2)
In the above equation the degree of price isolation of a country i relative to rest of world is
reected in terms of its population, Popi; area, Areai; and its natural level of openness to
trade determined by its geographic characteristics, OP FRi ; as constructed by Frankel and Romer
(1999).10 The squared term of ln yPPPi is included to capture potential non-linearities in the
relationship between real and nominal income.
We estimate equation (2) using data on PPP- and non-PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in
current prices from Penn World Tables for the period 1950-1990, as suggested by Prados de la
Escosura (2000).11 Information on population levels is also taken from Penn World Tables, while
information on the area of each country was collected from the CIAWorld Factbook. We perform
this estimation using three di¤erent estimation techniques, OLS, GLS and RLS, and pooling all
observations in a unique cross-section.12 The estimation results are reported in Table 1. Columns
(1) to (3) show the results for the baseline specication reected in equation (2) for each of the
three estimation techniques. As it can be seen from the rst three columns of Table 1, the three
techniques do not lead to substantially di¤erent coe¢ cients for PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, its
squared term and the other variables. Yet, the GLS estimation leads to greater standard errors
which indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation in the data. Moreover, the
robust least squares estimation do not reveal any extreme outliers in the data. For these reasons,
we are subsequently focusing on GLS estimates.
[Insert Table 1 (Short-Cut Estimation Results) here]
To make our regression specication more exible, in column (4) we allow the estimated
relationship between PPP- and non-PPP-adjusted GDP per capita to di¤er for countries that
are at di¤erent stages of economic development. To do so we include a "Periphery" dummy
variable which equals 1 if a countrys level of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in a given year is
less than or equal to 50% of that of the United States and 0 otherwise. To capture the various
ways in which the peripheral status of an economy could matter in this context, we allow the
dummy variable to inuence both the intercept as well as the coe¢ cients of PPP-adjusted GDP
10All three variables are expressed relative to the corresponding value for the U.S..
11Prados de la Escosura (2000) argues that international price level di¤erences observed during the period 1950-
1990 provide a good approximation of the corresponding di¤erences in the 19th century and early 20th century.
This may seem at rst as a rather heroic assumption. Yet, both the results obtained by him as well as our results
reported below, seem to attest to that assumption.
12The advantage of generalized over ordinary least squares is that it allows to account for potential autocor-
relation within panels as well as heteroscedasticity across panels. Robust least squares, on the other hand, limit
the weight of outliers by assigning more weight to observations with a smaller error term and omitting extreme
outliers with a Cooks D statistic greater than one.
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per capita. As the results of column (4) indicate, this e¤ect seems to be primarily operating
through the slope coe¢ cients.
In column (5) we introduce an additional dummy variable to account for the fact that the
1950-1990 period used for the estimation of equation (2) encompasses both the more stable -in
terms of exchange rate volatility- Bretton Woods era as well as the more turbulent post-1970
era. This "Currency Regime" dummy, which we also interact with the income terms, allows to
separate the two eras and capture di¤erences in the relationship between PPP- and non-PPP-
adjusted GDP across the two regimes. As the results of column (5) indicate, the nature of the
relationship seems to indeed vary with the exchange rate regime.
Finally, in column (6) we add both the "Periphery" and the "Currency Regime" dummies to
allow for both variation across di¤erent levels of economic development and exchange rate regimes
in our estimated relationship between PPP- and non-PPP-adjusted GDP. We also include all the
corresponding interaction terms with ln yPPP and (ln yPPP )2 apart from the interaction of the
squared income term with the currency regime dummy, which was shown to be insignicant in
column (5). This specication generates the best possible t for the data,13 while the resulting
estimation results appear to be very much in line with those of columns (3), (4) and (5).
2.2 Nominal GDP Estimates, 1870-1949
Having estimated the relationship between PPP-adjusted and non-PPP-adjusted GDP per capita
relative to the United States for the period 1950-1990, we now use it to make out-of-sample
predictions. Specically, we employ this relationship in order to predict non-PPP-adjusted GDP
for the period 1870-1949 for which we lack comprehensive data.
To make these predictions we use the estimated coe¢ cients of column (6) combined with the
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita data provided by Maddison (2001), expressed in current prices.14
This source is also used to obtain population gures for this earlier time period and to extend our
"Periphery" dummy variable accordingly. For the "Currency Regime" dummy we follow Prados
de la Escosura (2000) and assign to the classical gold standard period (1870-1913) the same value
as during the Bretton Woods era, as both regimes essentially imposed xed exchange rates. The
remaining years during the world wars and the interwar period are treated as equivalent in terms
of the currency regime to the post-1970 period. Finally, in cases where there have been areal
changes we adjust the area of each country accordingly.15
13We assess the specication t based on the adjusted R-squared coe¢ cients, which in the case of GLS can
be calculated in multiple ways. Here it corresponds to the squared correlation coe¢ cient between the predicted
value of ynon PPPi and its observed value.
14Maddisons GDP gures are expressed in constant 1990 prices. These are converted in current price terms
to make them comparable to the Penn World Tables current price GDP series that was used for the estimation
of equation (2). This conversion is done by multiplying the original gures with a 1990-base year U.S. Consumer
Price Index, taken from Measuring Worth (www.measuringworth.com/uscpi).
15Such adjustments are necessary for Austria and Hungary prior to 1918 as well as for Korea prior to 1948.
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Following this approach, we can construct estimates for nominal GDP per capita in current
prices relative to the United States and implied PPP-factors for a set of 68 countries spanning
the period from 1870 to 1949.16 Out of these 68 countries, we are able to obtain complete 80-year
time series for 57 countries and long series with more than 30 years of observations covering the
post-1900 period for additional 6 countries.17 The resulting sample is also quite representative
as it spans all ve continents of the world and represents countries of di¤ering levels of economic
development and political-economic systems.
To provide a sense of the quality of our estimates, in Figure 1 we compare our estimated values
of relative non-PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for the case of Great Britain with the actual values
obtained from available historical national accounts data. We chose the case of Britain as an
example, since it is the country with the greatest availability of good quality historical statistics
and the only one for which this comparison is possible in all years from 1870 to 1949.18 In
addition, Figure 1 also includes the corresponding level of per capita GDP of Britain relative to
the United Stated in PPP-adjusted terms based on Maddisons data in order to give an idea of
how the PPP-adjusted and non-PPP-adjusted gures di¤er in the period of interest.
[Insert Figure 1 (British Relative per Capita GDP) here]
As it can be seen from the gure, our estimated nominal GDP series matches very closely the
actual one, indicating that our approach based on the "short-cut" method does indeed generate
reasonable estimates. Moreover, as the signicant gap between the relative PPP-adjusted GDP
series from Maddison and the non-PPP-adjusted series indicates, this close match between our
non-PPP-adjusted GDP estimates and the actual ones is not driven by the absence of relative
price di¤erences between Britain and the U.S.. In fact, as it is clearly visible in the gure, the
British price level was substantially lower than that of the U.S. during all the years from 1870
to 1949, although this gap fell over time as British prices converged to American ones.
Apart from the case of Britain, this comparison of actual and estimated nominal GDP per
capita can be performed for a few more countries for which historical nominal GDP time series
are available. Based on information provided by Mitchell (2008) as well as by Smits, Woltjer,
and Ma (2009), we were able to obtain such series for the period prior to 1949 for 16 countries
-excluding the U.S..19 Figure 2 displays the weighted average of each of the three relative GDP
series for this set of 16 countries with weights based on each countrys aggregate PPP-adjusted
For all other countries the analysis is conducted based on their contemporary borders.
16The implied PPP-factor can be calculated by dividing the value of estimated non-PPP-adjusted GDP per
capita with the corresponding PPP-adjusted one.
17A detailed list of the countries and years of coverage can be found in the Appendix.
18As stated in the Appendix Britain and the United States are the only countries for which we have a complete
nominal GDP series as well as exchange rates going back to 1870.
19A list of these countries and the years of data coverage can be found in the appendix. Conversion to U.S.
dollars was made based on information provide in the Correlates of War Trade Data Set .
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level of GDP. Similar to the case of Britain, we can see that our estimated non-PPP-adjusted
GDP series matches very closely the values obtained from existing historical national accounts
statistics, while the PPP-adjusted series based on Maddisons data di¤ers substantially.
[Insert Figure 2 (Average Relative per Capita GDP - 16 Countries) here]
This discrepancy is also evident if the root mean square errors (RMSE) for the deviation
of our estimated nominal GDP values from the actual ones is calculated for these 16 countries.
This can be then compared to the corresponding RMSE of the deviation of Maddisons real
GDP series from the actual nominal series. This error is 22% for our estimated series and 44%
for Maddisons series.20 Taking also into account the relative size of countries and calculating
weighted errors, the discrepancy is even more striking with the error being on average only 16%
for our estimated series and 38% for the Maddison series.
3 World Trade Evolution, 1870-1949
Having constructed estimates for nominal GDP per capita for a large number of countries, we
now turn to combine these estimates with the nominal export and import data assembled by
Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) to calculate trade shares going back to 1870.21 When doing
so, we follow the standard practice of summing up for each country the total value of exports and
imports and dividing this value with our estimate of aggregate nominal GDP. This corresponds
to the above estimated value of non-PPP-adjusted GDP per capita multiplied by the respective
population gures from Maddison (2001).
Based on the available trade data and our nominal GDP estimates, we are able to calculate
trade shares for 51 countries, in addition to the U.S.. Among this set of countries, we have
24 countries for which we are able to track the complete evolution of trade shares for all non-
war years -1870-1913 and 1920-1938- as well as a total of 43 countries for which our estimated
trade shares series span more than 20 years. This greatly increases the available information
on historical trade shares compared to the case were only non-estimated nominal GDP data
from available historical sources are used. Based on the latter sources, we can construct trade
shares for just 14 countries, out of which complete series covering all non-war years can only be
calculated for six.22
To assess the quality of our estimated trade shares, in Figure 3 we display the evolution of
Britains trade share over the period from 1870 to 1949, using three possible measures. The blue
20These errors are substantially lower during the First Globalization Era (20% for our estimate and 39% for
the Maddison series) than during the interwar period (26% and 57% respectively.)
21The data are available on-line through the Correlates of War project: http://correlatesofwar.org.
22The complete list of all countries and years for which trade shares can be constructed based on estimated
and actual GDP data is available in the Appendix.
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line corresponds to our estimated trade share, while the red line uses instead of our estimated
non-PPP-adjusted GDP gures the actual values taken from the available historical sources. In
addition to those two measures, we also provide the trade share that would result if one would
simply divide the sum of exports and imports by the total value of PPP-adjusted GDP reported
by Maddison (2001) inated with the U.S. Consumer Price Index. This is the practice followed
by most of the existing literature and the series obtained this way is depicted by the green line.
We add this third measure in order to see the extent to which combining PPP-adjusted GDP
data with non-PPP-adjusted trade data would bias the implied trade shares.
[Insert Figure 3 (British Trade Share) here]
As Figure 3 demonstrates, the common practice of denominating nominal trade data with real
GDP leads to a sizeable underestimation of the British trade share prior to 1950. The resulting
discrepancy is substantial, particularly for earlier years, during which the price level of Britain
was signicantly lower than that of the United States. In stark contrast to this, we see that our
estimated trade share series matches closely the actual one, as it was the case with our nominal
GDP estimates in Figure 1.
Moving beyond the case of Britain, Figure 4 presents the corresponding comparison in terms
of trade shares for the 13 countries for which non-estimated nominal GDP data are available.23
The displayed series is a weighted average of the trade shares of all countries with weights based
on each countrys fraction in the sum of the 13 countriesGDP. As it was the case in Figure 3,
our estimated series matches closely the actual one, while both exceed greatly the one based on
the PPP-adjusted GDP series of Maddison.24 Moreover, a calculation of the corresponding root
mean square errors reveals that our estimated series on average deviates by only 23% from the
actual series, while the series based on PPP-adjusted GDP deviates in average by 39% from the
actual series.25 Weighting these deviations with each countrys share of aggregate GDP, leads to
a RMSE for our estimated series of only 17%, while the corresponding error of the series based
on PPP-adjusted GDP is 35%.
[Insert Figure 4 (Average Trade Share - 13 Countries) here]
Having established the quality of our historical trade share estimates, we proceed now to
discuss what they imply for the evolution of trade globally as well as across di¤erent regions
of the world. This information is displayed in the following two gures. First of all, Figure 5
23In this gure we omit the Netherlands, which constitutes a clear outlier with an implied trade share in non-war
years during the period 1870-1939 averaging around 158% and occasionally reaching values of 300%.
24This is due to the fact that during the time period under investigation all countries of the world -with the
exception of Australia in some years- had, according to our estimates, lower price levels than the United States.
25As it was the case with our estimated nominal GDP values, these deviations are substantially smaller during
the rst globalization era (14% for our estimates and 33% for the series based on PPP-adjusted GDP) than during
the interwar period (30% and 48% respectively.)
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depicts how the share of international trade in terms of GDP evolved for the world as a whole.
Here again, the blue line depicts our estimate that denominates the existing nominal trade data
with our estimated nominal GDP series, while the green line corresponds to the one obtained if
the real GDP data of Maddison (2001) are used instead. Both series are based on trade shares
from the same 51 countries mentioned above weighted by each countries share in total GDP. In
addition, Figure 5 also includes the equivalent world trade share series for the post-1950 period
using information on the trade shares for the same set of 51 countries reported in the Penn World
Tables and weighted correspondingly. We include this series in order to document how well our
estimated pre-1950 global trade share series lines up with the conventional post-1950 wisdom
regarding world trade.
[Insert Figure 5 (World Trade Share) here]
As Figure 5 documents, our estimated world trade share series, the blue line, is characterized
by a secular rise during the rst globalization era (1870-1913) and a sharp subsequent decline
during the interwar period (1919-1939). Thus, qualitatively our series appears in line with the
narrative o¤ered by Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) as well as Jacks, Meissner, and
Novy (2011) regarding the pre-World-War-II evolution of world trade.26 Yet, quantitatively our
estimated trade shares are much larger than the incorrectly calculated one, depicted by the green
line, that one would obtain by dividing the nominal trade data with real GDP. Specically, our
estimates suggest that the share of world trade increased from 18% in 1870 to 32% during the
rst globalization era, while an incorrect calculation that does not fully account for purchasing
power di¤erences across countries would reduce these numbers to 14% and 23% respectively.
Similarly, during the interwar period, while according to our estimates the share of world trade
fell from a pre-war level of 32% down to 11% in 1939, the incorrect trade share series displays a
much smaller reduction from 23% to 10%. Regarding the magnitude of the discrepancy between
the two series, this on average appears to be about 5.5 percentage points, which corresponds
to an underestimation of the global trade share by 24%. It should be stressed, though, that
this discrepancy is greater during the rst globalization era than during the interwar period -6.5
versus 3.4 percentage points- due to the relative price convergence that took place over time.27
Moreover, the evolution of the world trade share implied by our estimates appears also to
connect well with the post-1950 series based on Penn World Tables data. According to our
26Like many of the existing contributions in the literature, we take 1870 as the starting point of the rst
globalization era. This is partial due to the lack of comprehensive trade statistics that go back even further in
time. In principle, as ORourke and Williamson (2002) and Jacks (2005) have pointed out the rst globalization
era could potentially be extended by another 20 to 50 years by taking its starting point to be 1850 or even to
1820.
27It should be noted that the discrepancy between the two series would be even higher had the picture excluded
the corresponding gures for the United States which carries a weight of up to 30% in the global series and for
which there is no di¤erence between PPP and non-PPP adjusted GDP.
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estimates, during the late 1940s world trade uctuated in a band between 17.5% and 20.5% of
GDP, which is very similar to the movements observed in the 1950s and 1960s during which the
world trade share uctuated between 18.5 and 21.5%. Thus, both our estimated series and the
PWT series indicate that international trade was very stable during the rst 25 years after World
War II, averaging at a level of 19.5% of GDP and with a standard deviation of just 1 percentage
point. Moreover, our historical trade series reveals that the level of trade openness that the
world reached in 1913 at the peak of the rst globalization era was not reached again globally
before 1974. This conrms the evidence regarding the rebound of international trade based on
manufacturing products and merchandise trade presented by Beenstock and Warburton (1983),
Krugman (1995) and ORourke and Williamson (1999).
In contrast, the incorrectly calculated series suggests that the value of world trade in the late
1940s was around 14% of world GDP, which seems unreasonably low in light of the trade activity
observed during the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly, this series suggests that the share of world
trade at its pre-World-War-I peak was equivalent to that observed during the earlier 1950s,
which contradicts the aforementioned evidence. These observations suggest that an incorrect
calculation of trade shares, which does not take into account relative price di¤erences across
countries, may lead to a distorted picture regarding the evolution of world trade prior to 1950
and a profound underestimation of the rise and fall that took place from the rst globalization
era to the end of World War II.
Looking beyond the global picture, in Figure 6 the evolution of world trade over the period
1870-1949 is broken down into separate series for four key regions of the globe: the European
core, the European periphery, Latin America and Asia.28 A comparison of the regional series
reveals that the rise and fall of world trade that occurred from 1870 to 1939 was not uniformly
experienced across all regions of the world. While in terms of levels, trade shares at the start
of the rst globalization era were highest in Latin America and lowest in Asia, over this 40-year
period, though, the European core economies overtook the Latin American ones, in which the
share of international trade remained fairly constant. This upward trend was also experienced
by the economies of the European periphery and of Asia, but to a lesser extent.
[Insert Figure 6 (Regional Trade Shares) here]
Following the rst WorldWar and the subsequent Great Depression it was again the European
core economies that witnessed the greatest implosion of trade. Yet, during this period the
experience of Latin American and European peripheral economies was not di¤erent, as trade
shares dropped to levels that were even lower than those prevailing during the rst globalization
era. Interestingly, though, this downward trend was not shared by the Asian economies, which
28See the Appendix for a list of countries falling into each of the above mentioned regions.
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-according to our estimates- did not witness a disruption of the pre-World-War-I trade expansion
during the interwar period but rather a continuation of pre-existing trends.
In Figure 6 we have avoided adding the corresponding incorrectly calculated trade shares
that were shown in Figure 5 in order to not overcrowd the diagram. Yet, we should mention
here that the same remarks as those made above apply also for all the regional trade shares
series. Thus, trade shares based on a PPP-adjusted income measure are consistently lower than
the "true" ones based on non-PPP-adjusted GDP. Moreover, the degree of underestimation is
highest for the poorest regions of the world, which had the lowest relative price levels compared
to the United States.
4 Determinants of Bilateral Trade Flows, 1870-1939
In addition to our discussion of the evolution of national, regional and global shares of interna-
tional trade from 1870 to 1949, in the present paper we also seek to investigate more carefully
what determined these trade ows across countries over this period. We embark on this inves-
tigation in order to assess the extent to which an analysis of trade ows based on real income
values and nominal trade data, which is the approach followed by most of the existing literature,
would lead to incorrect inferences regarding the determinants of trade during this important
historical period.
4.1 Gravity Regression Results
To analyze trade ows across countries we pursue a gravity approach, which by now has become
standard in the empirical literature on international trade. According to this approach, the
level of trade between two economies is assumed to be driven by the size of as well as the
degree of inward and outward resistance exhibited by each economy.29 The former is typically
captured by each economys aggregate level of GDP, while the latter reects various types of
barriers to international trade. In the historical context of the rst globalization era and the
interwar period the two main factors inuencing the strength of these barriers were the extent of
tari¤ protection and the participation in the gold standard. In this respect we follow the work of
Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003), Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2011) and others who have
analyzed bilateral trade ows during these periods based on a gravity framework. Specically,
we estimate the following regression specication:
ln(Tradeijt) = + Y ln(YitYjt) + T ln(1 +
tit + tjt
2
) + GGoldijt + ij + t + "ijt: (3)
29See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for more details.
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Tradeijt refers to the sum of trade ows between two countries i and j at time t; Yit and Yjt
denote aggregate GDP in the two countries, tit and tjt correspond to the average tari¤ rate
in the two countries,30 while Goldijt is a dummy variable equaling one if both countries i and
j were on the gold standard at time t: The term ij denotes a pair xed e¤ect capturing any
time-invariant pair-specic factors, such as the distance between two countries, the existence of
a common border or the presence of a common language, that could inuence the extent of trade
between countries i and j:31 Finally, t denotes a time xed e¤ect capturing general time-varying
trends, such as the change in world income or the available technology.32
Both our trade ows and aggregate GDP variables are expressed in current prices, with the
former being taken from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) and the latter being estimated as
discussed in Section 2. The average tari¤ data are from Clemens and Williamson (2004) and
updated with the information provided by Schularick and Solomou (2011),33 while the coding of
the gold standard variable is based on the information provided by O¢ cer (2008).34 We focus
our analysis on the role of income, tari¤s and the gold standard in determining trade between
countries during the period from 1870 to 1939, as these are the variables that have attracted most
of the attention in the literature. An important di¤erence, though, between our approach and
that of the existing literature is that we estimate the above specication using non-PPP-adjusted
income and trade data. Thus, do not combine PPP-adjusted income data with non-PPP-adjusted
trade ows, which -as we show below- would tend to bias the estimated coe¢ cients.35
We estimate equation (3) separately for the rst globalization era (1870-1913) and the interwar
period (1919-1938) using an unbalanced panel of countries. In the former period this includes 202
30Given that available tari¤ data for the period of interest only provide information on average tari¤ rates per
country, we use the mean of the prevailing average tari¤ rates in the two countries to proxy for the actual bilateral
tari¤ rate which is not observed.
31We also considered an alternative specication with country xed e¤ects instead of pair xed e¤ects. Such a
specication has the advantage of allowing us to explicitly control for the e¤ect of key time-invariant pair-specic
characteristics such as distance, shared border or common language. Given, though, that the results of this
alternative specication are not substantially di¤erent and given the more parsimonious nature of a specication
with pair xed e¤ects, we chose not to present any results based on this alternative specication, which may be
subject to biases due to unobserved heterogeneity across pairs.
32Our specication does not explicitly account for transportation costs due to a lack of data at the country or pair
level. Yet, the inclusion of pair xed e¤ects, which among others account for the distance between two countries,
and the inclusion of time xed e¤ects, which among others reect the state of technology, implicitly allows us
to do so. This is because, as discussed in Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003), distance and technology
were the two main factors driving the evolution of transportation costs. Alternatively, we also considered a
specication which includes distance-decade interaction terms to explicitly account for the changing importance
of distance-related transportation costs. This, however, did not lead to qualitatively di¤erent results compared
to specication (3) and for this reason we do not present more details.
33We would like to explicitly thank Michael Clemens, Moritz Schularick, Solomos Solomou, and Je¤rey
Williamson for being kind enough to share their data with us.
34This information is available on-line at eh.net/encyclopedia/article/o¢ cer.gold.standard and we would also
like to thank Lawrence O¢ cer for kindly providing us with the data tables included in the article.
35As we explain below, though, we do compare our results with those obtained when PPP-adjusted income
data are used instead to give an indication regarding the nature of the alleged bias.
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distinct country pairs and in the latter 296.36 The results of this estimation based on OLS are
reported in Table 2. The left panel of the table displays the results for the 1870-1913 period, and
the right one for the 1919-1938 period. In each panel we compare the estimated coe¢ cients with
those obtained if the PPP-adjusted GDP data of Maddison (2001) inated with the U.S. CPI are
used instead of our estimated non-PPP-adjusted GDP values. The regressions displayed in each
of the two panels are estimated as two seemingly unrelated equations, using robust estimators
of the simultaneous variance-covariance matrix. At the bottom of each panel, we report for each
of the two periods the corresponding p-values for the tests of the equality of the coe¢ cients on
income, tari¤s and the gold standard.
[Insert Table 2 (Gravity Regressions - Full Sample) here]
Overall the results displayed in Table 2 conrm the importance of income levels, tari¤s rates
and gold standard membership as important determinants of bilateral trade ows. In both
periods the coe¢ cients of all three variables are statistically signicant and have the expected
signs. Higher income levels in either country led to increased bilateral trade, while greater tari¤
protection had the opposite e¤ect. Moreover, bilateral trade between countries was promoted
through adherence to the gold standard.37 We should note, however, that the low p-values of
the tests of equality for the coe¢ cients on each regressor at the bottom of each panel imply
that the estimated coe¢ cients on all three variables statistically di¤er depending on the type
of GDP measure used in the estimation. Specically, we see that the e¤ect of income tends to
be overestimated, while the e¤ect of tari¤s and the gold standard tend to be underestimated if
a PPP-adjusted income measure is used instead of a non-PPP-adjusted one. The intuition for
this bias is simple and stems from the fact that the relative dispersion of PPP-adjusted income
is much lower than that of non-PPP-adjusted income, as the latter encompasses not only the
dispersion in living standards but also that in price levels.
An important caveat to the above interpretation of the estimation results in Table 2 is that
they may be subject to endogeneity biases. A likely source of such bias is the gold standard
dummy, as Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) and Meissner (2005) have argued that pre-
existing trade linkages between countries inuenced the adoption of the gold standard. Thus,
to ensure that our results are not driven by this type of endogeneity we follow Estevadeordal,
Frantz, and Taylor (2003) and instrument the Gold dummy variable with the product of the
logarithm of each partner countrys average distance from all countries participating in the gold
standard in any given period. The results of this instrumental-variable estimation are displayed
36The unbalanced nature of the panel has little e¤ects on the estimation results. Even when we re-estimate
our specication in a balanced panel which includes 50 pairs during the pre-1913 period and 97 pairs during the
interwar period the results are qualitatively unchanged.
37In this respect our ndings conrm those of Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003), Lopez-Cordova and
Meissner (2003) and Jacks and Pendakur (2010).
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in Table 3 for both sub-periods.38 In either case the instrumentation strategy does not lead to
qualitatively di¤erent results, although the point estimates of the income coe¢ cients are lower
than the corresponding OLS estimates while those for tari¤s and the gold standard higher.39
Moreover, as in Table 2, when a PPP-adjusted GDP measure is used instead of a non-PPP-
adjusted one we still observe an overestimation of the e¤ect of income and an underestimation
of those of tari¤s and the gold standard.
[Insert Table 3 (Gravity Regressions - IV Results) here]
An additional concern regarding our ndings above of a relative underestimation of the e¤ects
of tari¤s and the gold standard and an overestimation of the e¤ect of income is that this may
be due to the fact that our nominal GDP data are estimated. To test that this is not the case,
we re-estimate our main specication (3) using only the country-pairs for which actual nominal
GDP data are available from historical sources. The results from these regressions are reported
in the two panels of Table 4. In each panel the rst column reports the estimated coe¢ cients
obtained with our estimated nominal GDP data, the second column those based on the real
income data of Maddison (2001) and the third column those when non-estimated nominal GDP
data are used.40 To ease comparisons between the results of each column we have kept the sample
constant across all three specications, using the information from just 26 country-pairs in the
rst subperiod and 55 pairs in the second.
[Insert Table 4 (Gravity Regressions - Restricted Sample) here]
This restriction to a substantially smaller sample obviously implies greater standard errors
and lower statistical signicance. Yet, the results of Table 4 appear to be generally in line with
the ndings from Tables 2 and 3. Income levels have a strong positive e¤ect on bilateral trade
ows, which e¤ect, however, tends to be overestimated when real GDP values are used instead of
nominal ones. The participation in the gold standard has a signicantly positive e¤ect on trade
ows and its magnitude tends to be underestimated when real GDP values are employed. Finally,
tari¤s have a statistically signicant negative e¤ect at least during the interwar period, which
again tends to be underestimated in the gravity regressions based real GDP data.41 Furthermore,
even in this restricted sample, a comparison of the regression coe¢ cients between columns (1)
and (2) as well as (2) and (3) in both panels reveals that they are statistically di¤erent from
38As following World War I all countries except for El Salvador had abandoned the use of gold until 1921, we
are forced in the second subperiod to restrict our estimation to the years from 1921 to 1938.
39To faciliate the comparison with the OLS estimates, the last part of the panel shows the correponding OLS
results for this reduced sample.
40The sources for these data are discussed in Section 2.
41We suspect that the insignicance of the average tari¤ variable during the rst globalization era is driven
by the fact that we only have information on 26 pairs during this time period and the calculated average tari¤s
variable is essentially based on tari¤ information from just 8 countries.
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one another, as the low p-values in the bottom of the table indicate. This conrms that the
overestimation of the income e¤ect and the underestimation of the tari¤and gold-standard e¤ects
in gravity regressions where nominal trade data are combined with real instead of nominal GDP
is not an artifact of the estimated nature of our nominal GDP data.
4.2 Relative Contributions of Income Growth, Tari¤s and the Gold
Standard in the Rise and Fall of Trade
Having established the importance of income growth, tari¤ rates and the expansion of the gold
standard in determining bilateral trade ows during the period from 1870 to 1939, we now
turn to an assessment of the relative importance of these three factors in comparison to common
global trends. We perform this assessment separately for each subperiod based on the coe¢ cients
estimated in column 1 of panels 1 and 2 in Table 2. Thus, we use the estimation results based
on non-PPP-adjusted income values to avoid the potential biases discussed above.
In order to assess the relative importance of income growth, tari¤ rate changes, participation
in the gold standard as well as common global trends for trade we perform a counterfactual
analysis in the spirit of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor
(2003). We calculate the counterfactual trade levels that would have resulted between any two
pair of countries i and j if only one of the four factors had changed over time and the other
variables had remained constant. Specically, suppose that the variable of interest x had changed
by the amount xt 1 between periods t and t   1: Then, if x is the coe¢ cient of variable x
derived from the gravity model, the counterfactual level of trade in period t would be:
TradeCijt = exp[xxt 1]  Tradeijt:
To assess the role of common global trends, which among other things capture the extent and
importance of changes in the transportation technology, we rely on the estimated year xed
e¤ects from each specication. This is because the xed e¤ects capture how di¤erent trade ows
are ceteris paribus in a given year compared to the initial year. Thus, with t being the estimate
of the time xed e¤ect in period t; the corresponding counterfactual level of trade in period t
would be
TradeCijt = exp[ t]  Tradeijt:
We calculate the relative contributions of each of the three pair-specic variables, income,
tari¤s and the gold standard, based on the average per-pair change observed over the whole two
periods 1870-1913 and 1919-1939. These contributions for each pair are then weighted by the
share of the joined GDP of the pair relative to the rest of the world. As for the time xed e¤ect,
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since we are interested in the contribution of global trends over the whole course of each of these
two periods, we use the values of the xed e¤ects in the nal years of each period - i.e. the values
in 1913 and 1938 - in our calculations.
On average, during the rst globalization era the product of nominal incomes grew by 3.8%
per year, implying that the typical country experienced an annual GDP growth rate of 1.9%
during this period. During the interwar period, the corresponding growth rate was 3.3%. As for
our average tari¤ measure, on average the per-pair tari¤ rate fell by 0.05 percentage points per
year during the rst globalization era and rose by 0.03 percentage points during the interwar
period. Finally, our gold standard dummy - which essentially reects the fraction of pairs being
on gold at a given time - on average increased by 1.5 percentage points per year during the rst
globalization era and fell by 0.55 percentage points during the interwar period.
Looking at these two periods as a whole the following trends should be noted. During
the rst globalization era the level of non-PPP-adjusted GDP per country grew on average by
approximately 80%, tari¤s fell by 2.3 percentage points and the participation in the gold standard
increased by 65 percentage points.42 During the interwar period the corresponding income growth
rate was on average 33.5%. At the same time, average tari¤s increased by 11 percentage points
and adherence to the gold standard declined by 0.6 percentage points.43 Finally, the value of the
xed e¤ects indicating the globally experienced changes in the log-level of bilateral trade over
the two periods of interest is 0.67 in 1913 and -0.82 and 1939.
[Insert Table 5 (Counterfactual Analysis) here]
Table 5 above reports the results of this counterfactual analysis. Given the income coe¢ cients
reported in Table 2, the cumulative growth performance of the world economy implies that
income growth contributed approximately 64% to trade growth during the rst globalization era
and about 33% during the interwar period. To be more precise, the value of 64.2% for income
during the pre-1913 period implies that trade would have been 64.2% lower than it actually
was in 1913 had income not increased between 1870 and 1913. Similarly for tari¤s, we have
that their fall contributed approximately 4% to trade growth during the rst globalization era
and their rise during the interwar period alone led to a 16% fall in world trade. Regarding the
contribution of the gold standard our gravity regression results imply that its expansion during
the rst globalization era contributed to a 10% increase in world trade, while its disintegration
during the interwar period played only a minor role for the evolution of bilateral trade relative
to that of income growth and tari¤ spikes. Finally, the values of the xed e¤ects imply that
42This means that if hypothetically in 1870 there were no pair of countries trading with one another whose
currencies where both xed to gold, by 1913 65% of all sample pairs were jointly on the gold standard.
43This low observed change in the gold standard variable is due to the fact that no expansion of the gold
standard took place during the interwar period. Most countries reintroduced the gold standard in the mid and
late 1920s and abandoned it again by the mid 1930s.
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common global trends contributed 49% to trade growth during the rst globalization era, and
would have led to a 128% decline in trade during the interwar period had not other factors, such
as income growth, counterbalanced this e¤ect.
Viewed from the perspective of the literature our ndings for the rst globalization era are
line with those of Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) and Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2010)
who attribute approximately 60% of pre-World-War-I trade expansion to income growth. They
also conrm the relative unimportance of tari¤ movements during that period in comparison to
global trends such as the decline in transportation costs. Moreover, similar to Lopez-Cordova
and Meissner (2003) we also nd a relatively small contribution of the gold standard expansion
of approximately 10%. Regarding the interwar period, our estimated contributions of income
growth and tari¤movements are close to those of Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003), who
nd the former to be approximately 34% and the latter 22%. Yet, we nd the disintegration
of the gold standard that took place over this period to be substantially less important than
existing studies and attribute the sharp fall of world trade that took place over the interwar
period mostly to adverse global trends.44
5 Concluding Remarks
The recent debate regarding the causes and the consequences of the increased economic integra-
tion that countries and regions of the world are experiencing today has triggered an increased
interest in the globalization trends that existed prior to World War II. This interest stems from
the conviction of a growing number of economists and economic historians that shedding light
on the various factors that drove the expansion of world trade during the rst globalization era
(1870-1913) and its backlash during the interwar period (1919-1939) can enhance our under-
standing of contemporary developments.
A major di¢ culty in the context of this literature, though, has been the relative scarcity
national account data compared to the post-War-World-II period. As a consequence, in order to
calculate trade shares prior to 1950 most researchers have combine PPP-adjusted GDP measures,
such as those of Maddison (2001), with nominal trade data, an approach which is subject to
systematic biases.
Contrary to existing work, this paper provides estimates of trade shares based on non-PPP-
adjusted GDP values which we estimate via the short-cut method. Our estimates indicate that
trade shares during the 1870-1949 period were on average 32% higher compared to existing
44Our nding of the relative unimportance of the evolution of the gold standard during the interwar period for
trade is due to our choice of 1919 as the starting year. This is because the disintegration of the gold standard took
place primarily during World War I, at the end of which almost no country adhered to the gold standard. Had
we performed a similar analysis starting in 1913, this would have led to a much greater role of the gold standard
for trade.
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accounts and the worlds level of openness to trade in 1913 had been comparable to that in 1974.
This implies that the rise and fall of world trade that took place over this period was much more
pronounced than previously documented.
Furthermore, employing our nominal GDP estimates in standard gravity regressions, we re-
assess the determinants of bilateral trade ows during this time period and the relative impor-
tance of income growth, tari¤ movements and the evolution of the gold standard. Our approach
di¤ers from existing work that has performed such estimations using PPP-adjusted income even
though the available trade data are expressed in nominal terms. In this context we nd that the
existing literature has tended to overemphasize the role of income movements relative to tari¤s
changes and the evolution of the gold standard.
As a nal note, we would like to stress that although in this paper we have focused on
analyzing the evolution of world trade between 1870 and 1949 and its determinants, we believe
that our contribution extends beyond that. The estimates of non-PPP-adjusted GDP and trade
shares that we provide via the "short-cut" method for a large set of countries can provide useful
benchmarks for any subsequent research on the matter. Moreover, in the absence of alternative
more comprehensive historical sources, we believe that our estimates of nominal income and
trade shares can be of great value-added to many researchers interested in this historical period.
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Table 1: Short-Cut Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Log of Relative non-PPP per capita GDP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation Method OLS RLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
ln(yPPP) 1.446*** 1.321*** 1.356*** 1.058*** 1.328*** 1.026*** 
[0.0194] [0.0164] [0.0289] [0.0831] [0.0321] [0.0833] 
ln(yPPP)^2 0.114*** 0.0721*** 0.0911*** -0.459*** 0.0877*** -0.457*** 
[0.00481] [0.00405] [0.00726] [0.123] [0.00834] [0.123] 
ln(Population) -0.0351*** -0.0299*** -0.0390*** -0.0391*** -0.0372*** -0.0374*** 
[0.00632] [0.00532] [0.0133] [0.0129] [0.0120] [0.0117] 
ln(Area) 0.102*** 0.0895*** 0.0627*** 0.0596*** 0.0656*** 0.0624*** 
[0.00629] [0.00530] [0.0121] [0.0119] [0.0111] [0.0108] 
ln(FR-Trade) 0.0708*** 0.0754*** 0.0208 0.0221 0.0282 0.0299 
[0.0181] [0.0152] [0.0392] [0.0380] [0.0354] [0.0342] 
ln(yPPP) x Periphery 0.249** 0.272*** 
[0.100] [0.0991] 
ln(yPPP)^2 x Periphery 0.544*** 0.542*** 
[0.122] [0.122] 
ln(yPPP) x Currency Regime 0.0553** 0.0355*** 
[0.0258] [0.00756] 
ln(yPPP)^2 x Currency Regime 0.0059 
[0.00701] 
Periphery -0.0806 -0.0659 
[0.0595] [0.0583] 
Currency Regime 0.0722*** 0.0639*** 
[0.0194] [0.0157] 
Observations 4097 4097 4097 4097 4097 4097 
Adj. R-squared 0.880 0.769 0.878 0.879 0.879 0.880 
Notes: All variables except from dummies are relative to those of the United States; standard errors  in brackets. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1: British Relative per Capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Relative per Capita GDP - 16 Countries 
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Figure 3: British Trade Share 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Trade Share - 13 Countries 
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Figure 5: World Trade Share 
 
 
Figure 6: Regional Trade Shares 
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Table 2: Gravity Regressions – Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Trade Flow (non-PPP) 
1870-1913 1919-1938 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Income Measure Estimated Maddison Estimated Maddison 
Income 0.637*** 0.708*** 0.603** 0.658*** 
[0.0511] [0.0555] [0.0692] [0.0876] 
Tariffs -1.754*** -1.687*** -1.288932*** -1.262*** 
[0.480] [0.4808] [0.337] [0.339] 
Gold 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.0758** 0.0725** 
[0.0295] [0.0294] [0.0332] [0.0334] 
Test for equality of 
coefficients (p-value) 
Income: 0.0000 Income: 0.0266 
Tariffs: 0.0035 Tariffs: 0.0565 
Gold: 0.0049 Gold: 0.0473 
Obs. 4964 4964 3853 3853 
Adj. R-squared 0.8905 0.8907 0.9387 0.9384 
Notes: OLS estimation  results with pair and year fixed effects, not reported; robust standard errors in brackets. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3: Gravity Regressions – IV Results 
  Dependent Variable: Log of bilateral nominal (non-PPP) trade flow 
Estimation 
Method 2SLS 2SLS OLS 
  1870-1913 1921-1938 1921-1938 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (2a) (2b) 
Income 
Measure Estimated Maddison Estimated Maddison Estimated Maddison 
              
Income 0.294** 0.363** 0.828*** 1.132*** 0.678*** 0.756*** 
  [0.153] [0.172] [0.138] [0.233] [0.0733] [0.0926] 
Tariffs -5.797*** -5.431*** -1.209*** -1.147*** -1.288*** -1.255*** 
  [1.740] [1.806] [0.367] [0.393] [0.356] [0.358] 
Gold 1.452*** 1.349** -0.654 -1.0938a 0.0749** 0.0701** 
  [0.517] [0.539] [0.625] [0.692] [0.0349] [0.0350] 
             
1st  Stage F-Stat. 18.825 16.204 26.789 23.849 - - 
Adj. R-squared - - - - 0.9392 0.9389 
Obs. 4964 4964 3726 3726 3726 3726 
2SLS estimation results with pair and year fixed effects, not reported; “Gold” instrumented by the sum of the natural 
logarithms of the average distance of each country from all other countries on the gold standard; the reported first-stage F-
statistic is the partial F-statistic testing the significance of the excluded instrument in the corresponding first-stage 
regression; included; robust standard errors in brackets. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4: Gravity Regressions – Restricted Sample 
  Dependent Variable: Log of bilateral trade flow (non-PPP) 
  1870-1913 1919-1938 
  (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) 
GDP Measure Estimated Maddison Actual Estimated Maddison Actual 
              
Income 1.411*** 1.706*** 1.108*** 1.0278*** 1.397*** 0.0484 
  [0.201] [0.222] [0.157] [0.0863] [0.117] [0.0552] 
Tariffs 0.817 2.372 -1.0631 -2.380*** -2.194*** -4.0330*** 
  [1.708] [1.793] [1.405] [0.771] [0.756] [0.853] 
Gold 0.252*** 0.237*** 0.313*** 0.0679* 0.0640* 0.119*** 
  [0.0769] [0.0766] [0.0788] [0.0387] [0.0386] [0.0425] 
Test for equality 
of coefficients 
(p-value) 
Income: 0.0000            Income: 0.0000           Income: 0.0000            Income: 0.0000   
         Tariffs: 0.0000             Tariffs: 0.0000           Tariffs: 0.0063             Tariffs: 0.0001 
         Gold: 0.0140                Gold: 0.0012           Gold: 0.2173                Gold: 0.0053 
            
Obs. 937 937 937 628 628 628 
Adj. R-squared 0.8868 0.8882 0.8858 0.9781 0.9782 0.9742 
Notes: OLS estimation results with pair and year fixed effects, not reported; robust standard errors in brackets. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5: Counterfactual Analysis 
Total change in Trade explained by Gravity Model 
Contributions of 1870-1913 1919-1938 
Income 64.2% 33.1% 
Tariffs 3.9% -15.5% 
Gold Standard 10.0% -0.045% 
Global Trends 48.7% -128.0% 
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Appendix: List of Countries 
Country Est. Nominal 
GDP 
Act. Nominal 
GDP 
Est. Trade Share Act. Trade 
Share 
Region 
Algeria 1870-1949     
Argentina 1870-1949  1870-1949  Latin America 
Australia 1870-1949 1870-1931 1920-1949 1920-1931  
Austria 1870-1949  1870-1913, 
1919-1938 
 European Core 
Belgium 1870-1949 1870-1913, 
1920-1939, 
1946-1949 
1870-1914, 
1919-1940 
1945-1949 
1870-1913, 
1920-1939, 
1946-1949 
European Core 
Bolivia 1945-1949     
Brazil 1870-1949  1870-1949  Latin America 
Bulgaria 1870-1949  1908-1917, 
1919-1949 
 European Periphery 
Canada 1870-1949 1926-1949 1920-1949 1926-1949  
Chile 1870-1949  1870-1949  Latin America 
China 1870-1949  1870-1940, 
1942-1943, 
1946-1949 
 Asia 
Colombia 1900-1949  1900-1949  Latin America 
Costa Rica 1920-1949  1920-1949  Latin America 
Czechoslovakia 1870-1949  1919-1939, 
1945-1949 
 European Periphery 
Denmark 1870-1949 1870-1940 1870-1940, 
1945-1949 
1870-1940 European Core 
Ecuador 1939-1949  1939-1949  Latin America 
Egypt 1870-1949  1937-1949   
El Salvador 1920-1949  1920-1949  Latin America 
Finland 1870-1949 1920-1945 1919-1949 1920-1945 European Core 
France 1870-1949 1870-1913, 
1920-1938 
1870-1917, 
1920-1949 
1870-1913, 
1920-1938 
European Core 
Germany 1870-1949  1870-1913, 
1920-1944 
 European Core 
Ghana 1870-1949     
Greece 1870-1949  1870-1913, 
1919-1940, 
1945-1949 
 European Periphery 
Guatemala 1920-1949  1920-1949  Latin America 
Haiti 1945-1949     
Honduras 1920-1949 1925-1949 1920-1949 1925-1949 Latin America 
Hong Kong 1870-1949     
Hungary 1870-1949  1870-1913, 
1919-1949 
 European Periphery 
India 1870-1949     
Indonesia 1870-1949     
Iran 1870-1949  1870-1949  Asia 
Iraq 1870-1949  1932-1949  Asia 
Ireland 1870-1949  1922-1949  European Core 
Italy 1870-1949  1870-1942, 
1946-1949 
 European Periphery 
Jamaica 1870-1949     
Japan 1870-1949 1885-1940 1870-1944 1885-1940 Asia 
Jordan 1870-1949     
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List of Countries (cont.) 
Country Est. Nominal 
GDP 
Act. Nominal 
GDP 
Est. Trade Share Act. Trade 
Share 
Region 
Korea 1870-1949 1911-1940 1888-1905  Asia 
Malaysia 1870-1949     
Mexico 1870-1949 1925-1949 1870-1913, 
1918-1949 
1925-1949 Latin America 
Morocco 1870-1949  1870-1911   
Myanmar 1870-1949     
Nepal 1870-1949  1920-1923  Asia 
Netherlands 1870-1949 1870-1913, 
1921-1939 
1870-1913, 
1915-1949 
1870-1913, 
1921-1939 
European Core 
New Zealand 1870-1949  1920-1949   
Nicaragua 1920-1949  1920-1949  Latin America 
Norway 1870-1949  1905-1913, 
1919-1940 
1945-1949 
 European Core 
Panama 1945-1949     
Paraguay 1870-1949  1939, 1946-1949 
 
 Latin America 
Philippines 1870-1949     
Poland 1870-1949  1920-1939, 
1946-1949 
 European Periphery 
Portugal 1870-1949  1870-1916, 
1918-1949 
 European Periphery 
Romania 1870-1949  1878-1915, 
1919-1942, 
1946-1949 
 European Periphery 
Singapore 1870-1949     
South Africa 1870-1949 1920-1949 1920-1949 1920-1949  
Spain 1870-1949 1870-1940 1870-1949 1870-1940 European Periphery 
Sri Lanka 1870-1949     
Sweden 1870-1949 1870-1913, 
1915-1949 
1870-1949 1870-1913, 
1915-1949 
European Core 
Switzerland 1870-1949  1870-1949  European Core 
Syria 1870-1949     
Taiwan 1870-1949 1903-1938    
Thailand 1870-1949  1887-1939, 
1946-1949 
 Asia 
Tunisia 1870-1949  1876-1879   
Turkey 1870-1949  1870-1913, 
1919-1949 
  
United Kingdom 1870-1949 1870-1949 1870-1949 1870-1949 European Core 
Uruguay 1870-1949  1882-1949  Latin America 
Venezuela 1870-1949  1870-1949  Latin America 
Yugoslavia 1870-1949  1878-1912, 
1920-1940. 
1945-1949 
 European Periphery 
 
 
 
